Author: Guest Contributor

Written by Leigh Henderson

On the 40^th anniversary of the global eradication of smallpox, there are calls for attacking the COVID-19 pandemic as smallpox was attacked. One hallmark of smallpox eradication has been undertaken with enthusiasm—research. Scientists around the world are investigating COVID-19. Scientific journals are waiving their usual access fees to ensuring rapid and widespread communication of results.

Can smallpox eradication be a model for tackling the COVID-19 epidemic? Yes and no. Smallpox eradication could not have succeeded without its basic management, organization, and epidemiologic principles. These ‘lessons’ apply broadly and can influence the success or failure of global public health programs. 

However, the two diseases are very different. Smallpox had many characteristics that made it a viable candidate for eradication, and the strategies used took advantage of these. Confronting COVID-19 will require different strategies.

Written by Leigh Henderson

COVID-19 has dominated the headlines, quarantined much of the U.S. population, and devastated the U.S. economy. As of June 12, the United States reported 2 million confirmed and probable cases with 111,000 deaths.¹ There were, an estimated 271,000 hospitalizations.²

When COVID-19 was first reported, most of the population was self-quarantined and non-essential businesses were closed. We were told that this would ‘flatten’ the epidemic curve. It would extend the duration of the epidemic but would ease the burden on overtaxed hospitals. The number of patients would be distributed over a longer period, but there would be fewer at any one time.

Why did we not take the most obvious step to ‘ease the burden’? 

Written by John Hoffman

I am not sure that leaders at all levels fully appreciate the grave danger we face with our food supply, our economy and our nation. The food system in the United States represents one sixth of our economy. Historically, as the food system goes, so goes the economy. The national food infrastructure has always had a direct impact on confidence in government.

Many in our nation face growing food supply insecurity today. This is particularly true in the large cities. Today we have broad shortages that are in the range of 20% of key protein products.  Food prices are rising as a consequence of production cuts that have created these shortages and supply disruptions. This is all the result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the failure of the federal interagency team to take the necessary steps to assure full access to the things every family needs every day.  What we are seeing today need not have been the case. 

Written by Dennis Haugh, Dave Morgan and Ron Scott

Everyone in the United States has now become painfully aware of how computer models can impact their lives. We can no longer ignore their existence. Every citizen needs to have a rudimentary understanding, not of modeling itself—but of when it can be trusted and when it cannot. 

There is a fundamental question of knowing the future. In 2007, The Black Swan explored the bounds of our knowledge in a world of uncertainty and introduced the “ludic fallacy”—using the past to predict the future.^[1] This paper puts some of the concepts from that book into the context of computer modeling.

The response to the Covid-19 pandemic response has largely been based upon the published predictions from models like the ones constructed by the Imperial College^[2] and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME).^[3] Had these models not produced the fear they did, the impact of the pandemic would have been reduced significantly.

Written by Peter R. Jutro, PhD

The recent name-calling regarding COVID-19 (Wuhan virus, Chinese virus, or Kung Flu) is hardly without precedent, but certainly not helpful for preventing the next pandemic.

History provides us with many examples of nations attempting to shift blame for disease problems. Although the 14th Century Black Death, or Black Plague’s Yersinia Pestis bacterium most likely moved westward from Asia to Europe along the Silk Road, it never acquired a geographic name.  Perhaps the earliest disease to become the cause of international blame-shifting, took place in the 15th and 16th centuries, when many countries tried to assign responsibility for one particular disease to other countries.